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pick up where Gardner left off and resolve these issues consistent with
the purpose of the compulsory counterclaim rule.
HARRIET S. SUGAR

Criminal Law-State v. Looney: Defendants' Need for CourtOrdered Psychiatric Evaluations of Witnesses' Credibility
Outweighed by Witnesses' Right to Privacy
A growing number of states have held that in criminal trials judges
have the discretion to order a psychiatric examination of a key prosecution witness when there is evidence the examination may disclose an
abnormal mental condition bearing on credibility.' In a case of first
impression, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v.
Looney2 refused to join this growing body of jurisdictions recognizing
such discretion in the trial court. Without expressly deciding whether
the trial judge lacked the inherent authority to order a witness to submit to a psychiatric exam, the supreme court strongly suggested that
under present North Carolina criminal procedure the trial judge should
not order such an examination of a witness in the absence of specific
statutory guidelines provided by the North Carolina legislature.3 The
Looney court then concluded that, even if the trial court could properly
have granted defendant's motion for a court-ordered exam, denial of
the motion under the circumstances of the Looney case was not an
abuse of discretion.4
On December 30, 1974, the mutilated body of defendant Looney's
wife was discovered in the Looney home.5 Subsequent investigation of
1. For a recent case evidencing the trend toward sanctioning court-ordered psychiatric ex-

ams, see Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. 1977). For a collection of cases on the
subject, see Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1433 (1968). Federal courts trying criminal cases also have the

authority to order a government witness to submit to a psychiatric examination in order to probe

the witness' credibility. See, e.g., United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2. 294 N.C. 1, 240 S.E.2d 612 (1978).
3. Id. at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 627.

4. Id.
5. Record at 22. The police officials involved in the case and the pathologist who performed
an autopsy on the body later testified under cross-examination that the case was the most, or one

of the most, brutal homicides they had encountered. Id. at 22, 25, 31, 34. The decedent received

several blows and stabs that independently would have been fatal. Id. at 34. The body showed

evidence of more than 60 severe wounds. Id. at 32. In support of his motion for a psychiatric
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the murder led to the arrest of Richard Stanley Matthews who, in a
signed confession, stated that he killed the decedent after she rejected
his sexual advance.6 Matthews was examined at a state hospital and
was found sane and competent to stand trial.7 In exchange for a reduc-

tion in the charge against him,8 Matthews agreed to testify for the State,
alleging that defendant, Jasper David Looney, hired him to do the kill-

ing.9 Defendant repeatedly denied his guilt, claiming that he had been
happily married and that he had never met Matthews.

0

Nevertheless,

Looney was convicted of conspiring with Matthews to commit murder
and of being an accessory before the fact."
exam defendant Looney argued that the brutality of the murder suggested it was performed by a
psychopathic killer. Id. at 11; see note 12 infra.
6. Matthews' statement described in detail how he accomplished the slaying with a hammer,
a pair of scissors, and two knives. Record at 8-9. In his motion for a court-ordered exam defendstarted to hit her in the head.., and the more blood I
ant pointed to Matthews' statement, "I...
seen the more blood I wanted to see," id. at 9, as further evidence that Matthews had a psychopathic personality that would affect the accuracy and veracity of his testimony, id. at 11.
7. 294 N.C. at 4, 240 S.E.2d at 614. Matthews was examined at Dorothea Dix Hospital in
Raleigh, North Carolina, which provides care and treatment for the insane. Id. at 17, 240 S.E.2d
at 621. During the psychiatric exam Matthews denied having killed Mrs. Looney. Record at 16.
The examining staff psychiatrist stated in his report to the court:
He was given the MMPI [Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory] . . . and the
results. . . strongly suggested that the patient has a need to see himself as an extremely
virtuous individual. He presented himself in an unrealistically favorable light concerning self-control, moral values, and freedom from everyday human frailties. Individuals
with his results do at times show maladaptive hyperactivity, irritability, anger, and an
Psychiatric examination of the defendant, does
inability to postpone gratification ....
not reveal the presence of a psychiatric disorder which would render the patient unable
to know right from wrong or unable to know the nature and consequences of his actions. . . . PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS: Without Psychosis, Not Insane.
id. at 15-16.
The psychiatrist later testified for defendant Looney as follows:
The results of the tests and interviews [with Matthews] indicated the possibility of a
psychopathic personality and a maniac state which is the opposite of depression.
*. . As a result of my psychological testing and interviews with Richard Stanley
Matthews I found evidence indicating that he had personality characteristic of a psychopath. . . . The characteristics of a psychopathic personality reveal one that is notoriously disloyal, unable to form trusting relationships, dishonest, feels no guilt over pain
and suffering they inflict on others, unable to postpone gratification and will do anything
they can to get their way.
* * * My opinion is that that conduct [suggested by State's exhibits of the body's
condition] is highly suggestive but not necessarily diagnostic of a psychopath.
Id. at 123-24.
8. Record at 48.
9. Id. Thus, in a one-month period witness Matthews took three positions with respect to
his guilt: first, that he had killed the decedent acting alone (statement to police); second, that he
was innocent (statement to psychiatrist); and finally, that he had performed a "contract killing"
for defendant Looney (plea-bargaining position). Matthews thereafter pleaded guilty to second
degree murder and received a life sentence. 294 N.C. at 3-4, 240 S.E.2d at 613.
10. 294 N.C. at 8-9, 240 S.E.2d at 616.
11. Id. at 3, 240 S.E.2d at 613. Looney had also been charged with murder, but that charge
was later dismissed. Id.
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Looney moved unsuccessfully on two occasions prior to trial for
the court to order Matthews to submit to a psychiatric examination to
determine whether Matthews had an abnormal mental condition that
would affect his credibility. 2 Looney contended on appeal 3 that the
brutality of the crime,' 4 the findings of abnormal personality in Matthews' competency examination,' 5 the inconsistent positions taken by
Matthews,' 6 and the importance of his testimony1 7 justified an order for
a second psychiatric exam to explore the possibility that Matthews was
a psychopathic liar. 8 Defendant further pointed out that the earlier
exam had focused on Matthews' sanity as a defendant, not on Matthews' credibility as a witness.' 9 Overruling this and other exceptions,2 ° the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld both counts of
12. In his first motion Looney recited the brutality of the murder and Matthews' inconsistent
positions concerning the crime and alleged that Matthews' acts were those of an independent
psychopathic killer. Looney contended that it was essential to his defense to determine the complainant's psychological make-up and that a psychological exam could be helpful in arriving at
the truth. Record at 11-12. The motion continued:
NOW, THEREFORE, the defendant moves that a psychiatric examination of Richard Stanley Matthews, Jr. be granted this defendant; that a Court order issue whereby he
is to submit himself under proper supervision to a psychiatric examination by a psychiatrist not under the direct control of the State of North Carolina, and that a copy of that
report be furnished to the defendant ....
Id. at 12. The motion was denied, the judge stating that he questioned whether a trial court had
the authority to order such a psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 17. Defendant repeated his motion
competency/sanity examination, which had revealed perafter learning the results of Matthews'
sonality abnormalities. See note 7 supra. Although defendant cited some authority for the proposition that the court could order the exam, the motion was again denied. The judge stated that
defendant had not presented any substantial additional facts regarding Matthews' psychiatric
make-up and noted that Matthews had already received one psychiatric examination. Record at
17-19.
13. The supreme court allowed defendant to consolidate his appeal from the conspiracy conviction to the North Carolina Court of Appeals with his appeal from the accessory conviction to
the North Carolina Supreme Court. 294 N.C. at 3, 240 S.E.2d at 613.
14. See note 5 supra. In his testimony Matthews explained the brutality of the crime by
saying defendant had requested that Matthews make it look like a maniac had done the job. 294
N.C. at 6, 240 S.E.2d at 615.
15. 294 N.C. at 16-17, 240 S.E.2d at 621; see note 7 supra.
16. Record at 11; see note 9 supra.
17. Record at 12. The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with defendant that Matthews'
testimony "was the key to the prosecution's case against the defendant." 294 N.C. at 16, 240
S.E.2d at 621. The State, however, introduced six witnesses to rebut defendant's claims that he
had been happily married, including evidence that he was having an extramarital affair, and that
he did not know Matthews. Record at 53-79. The State also showed that defendant was cobeneficiary of life insurance policies on his wife's life totalling $68,000. 294 N.C. at 6-8, 240 S.E.2d at
615-16.
18. 294 N.C. at 16-17, 240 S.E.2d at 622.
19. Id. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628.
20. The supreme court rejected defendant's claim that his conspiracy conviction was a lesser
included offense of his accessory before the fact conviction, noting that the reaching of an agreement was an essential element of the conspiracy offense but not of the accessory offense, and that
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Looney's conviction.21 In its opinion the Looney court surveyed the
decisions of other states that have held that their trial courts have the
discretionary authority to order a prosecution witness to submit to a
psychiatric examination.2 2 The supreme court concluded that these decisions underestimated the jury's ability to reach an appropriate evaluation of the credibility of a mentally disturbed witness without expert
assistance,23 and also overlooked the burden a court-ordered psychiatric exam places on the witness.24 Employing a balancing-of-interests
test, the court reasoned that an innocent defendant's need for a courtordered exam was outweighed by the witness' right to privacy and by
the public interest in encouraging testimony. The court strongly implied that for these reasons, North Carolina courts should not grant a
motion for a court-ordered exam without specific statutory authority.25
The court then concluded that, even if the court below had the discretion to order such an exam, it properly refused to do so because defendant had failed to show a "compelling necessity" for the exam.26
actual commission of the related felony was essential to an accessory charge but not to a conspiracy charge. Id. at 10-11, 240 S.E.2d at 617-18. The court also rejected defendant's contention that
because Matthews had previously been examined by a state-employed psychiatrist, it was "fundamentally unfair" for the State to deny him an opportunity to have Matthews examined by an
independent psychiatrist. Id. at 17, 240 S.E.2d at 621 (distinguishing State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560,
143 A.2d 530 (1958)).
21. Id. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628.
22. Id. at 18-28, 240 S.E.2d at 622-27.
23. Id. at 18, 28, 240 S.E.2d at 622, 627.
24. Id. at 23, 28, 240 S.E.2d at 624, 627.
25. Id. at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 627. The supreme court did not expressly hold that to order a
witness to submit to a psychiatric exam would be beyond the judicial power. The court did,
however, clearly express its opinion that the need for the exam was outweighed by the burden it
placed on the witness and on the prosecutorial function, and implied that to allow the granting of
Looney's motion would be a "drastic change" in North Carolina criminal procedure. Id. That
the court went on to conclude that even if the trial court had the power, its denial of the motion
was not an abuse of discretion, suggests that the supreme court only reached a firm conclusion on
the propriety of ordering an exam, not on the power of the court to order the exam.
26. Id. at 28-29, 240 S.E.2d at 628. The supreme court apparently raised on its own motion
the general issue whether a court-ordered exam would ever be proper in North Carolina. The
State conceded in its brief that the court below had discretionary authority to order the exam
based on inherent judicial power and on implications of present statutory powers. Brief for Appellee at 9 (citing N.C.R. Ctv. P. 35, 45(b); State v. Woods, 293 N.C. 58 235 S E.2d 47 (1977)).
The State's primary argument was that there had been no abuse of discrelion in denying defendant's motions. Brief for Appellee at 13. The court agreed. 294 N.C. at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 627.
In a concurring opinion Justice Exum agreed with the majority that there had been no abuse
of discretion, but stated that he would hold that North Carolina trial courts should grant a similar
motion if the defendant makes a "strong showing" that a psychiatric examination would probably
reveal a mental condition raising serious question about the witness' credibility. Id. at 29, 240
S.E.2d at 628 (concurring opinion).
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In the criminal law context a psychiatric examination, and the ex-

pert opinion drawn from its results, may be used for four distinct purposes. First, examination of a criminal defendant is often required to
aid the trial judge in determining whether the accused is competent to
stand trial.27 Second, there may be an examination of the defendant by

one or more psychiatrists who later give testimony to aid the jury in
deciding whether the accused was sufficiently sane to be held legally
responsible for his alleged criminal acts.28 Third, and less frequently,
psychiatric examination of a witness in a criminal trial may be useful to
the judge in determining whether the person examined is a competent
30
witness 2 9 or, fourth, useful to the jury in weighing witness credibility.
The Looney decision runs counter to the trend in other states in

which there has been increasing acceptance of the fourth use of courtordered exams mentioned above-to aid the jury in assessing witness
credibility. 3' As noted by the Looney court, 32 the impetus for finding
27. The legal standards for making judgments about abnormalities in a defendant's or a witness' mental condition vary among the states. In general, when presented with an issue of competency to stand trial, the trial judge must determine whether the accused has sufficient
understanding of the nature and consequences of the charges and proceedings being brought
against him and whether he has the ability to cooperate with his lawyer in preparing his defense.
See, e.g., State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 575, 234 S.E.2d 587, 592 (1977).
28. Although various tests have been employed, in most states the accused will be held legally responsible for his acts or will be treated as criminally insane depending on whether, in the
jury's opinion, given his mental condition at the time of his alleged criminal conduct, the accused
had the ability to know what he was doing and whether it was right or wrong. See generally
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The North Carolina rule was recently
stated as follows: "[T]he test of insanity as a defense to a criminal charge is the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of and in respect to the matter under investigation."
State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 569, 213 S.E.2d 305, 318 (1974).
29. The emerging modem standard for witness competency is whether the prospective witness has such mental capacity to observe, recollect, and relate events that his testimony will aid the
\jury in finding facts. See generally McCoRMIcK's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 62
(2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]. The rule in North Carolina is whether
the proposed witness has the capacity "to understand and to relate under the obligation of an oath
facts which will assist the jury in determining the truth with respect to the ultimate facts which it
will be called upon to decide." State v. Cooke, 278 N.C. 288, 290, 179 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1971).
30. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 45. The cases that have accepted this fourth
use of psychiatric testimony are cited in note 37 infra. The issue whether the court below should
have granted defendant's motion for a court-ordered psychiatric examination of Matthews involves the last of these four uses of psychiatric testimony. It is relevant to the weight a trial judge
should give any previous examinations of the witness that in the first three situations a person's
mental condition is assessed for the purpose of making an absolute legal classification, that is, a
person either is or is not competent to stand trial, criminally insane, or competent as a witness.
But in the fourth situation, a psychiatrist's testimony concerning the witness' mental condition is
intended to be helpful to the jury in deciding what weight to give a witness' testimony, not
whether a witness is absolutely incredible or completely credible. See note 67 infra.
31. See note I supra.
32. 294 N.C. at 18, 240 S.E.2d at 622.
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trial court discretion to order a prosecution witness to submit to psychiatric evaluation was provided by Dean Wigmore. 33 Influenced by alleged advances in psychiatry, and more specifically the use of

psychiatric examination in identifying rape complainants suffering
from delusion,34 Wigmore proposed that a psychiatric examination of
the complainant be required in sex-offense cases.35

Although no state has adopted a mandatory exam rule,36 most
states confronted with the issue have upheld the trial court's discretion

to order such an exam. 37 A survey of jurisdictions employing a discretionary rule reveals differing judicial treatment of three primary issues

arising from application of the rule. First, certain courts strictly limit
the rule to sex-offense cases,38 while other courts employ a rule of gen-

eral applicability, permitting the trial judge to order witness-credibility
33. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970).

34. Professor Wigmore cited five medical authorities to support his conclusion that many
innocent men were sentenced to prison because without the results of psychiatric examinations of
the complaining witnesses they were unable to attack the plausibility of the complainants' testimony. See id. at 740-46.
35. Since Wigmore's proposal, substantial progress has been made in psychiatric diagnosis of
abnormal personalities and in the understanding of the extent to which mental disorders may
affect credibility. See generally Conrad, PsychiatricLie Detection, 21 F.R.D. 199, 214-15 (1957);
Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibilityof Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 648 (1960).
36. See, e.g., State v. Wahrlich, 105 Ariz. 102, 112,459 P.2d 727,730 (1969); State v. Maestas,
190 Neb. 312, 313, 207 N.W.2d 699, 700 (1973). Several states expressly rejected Wigmore's proposal. See, e.g., State v. Walgraeve, 243 Or. 328, 412 P.2d 23 (1966); State v. Klueber, 81 S.D. 223,
132 N.W.2d 847 (1965).
37. See, e.g., State v. Wahrlich, 105 Ariz. 102,459 P.2d 727 (1969); Ballard v. Superior Court,
64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966); Taborsky v. State, 142 Conn. 619, 116 A.2d
433 (1955); McDonald v. State, 307 A.2d 796 (Del. 1973); Dinkins v. State, 244 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1971); State v. Kahinu, 53 Haw. 536, 498 P.2d 635 (1972), cert. denied,409 U.S. 1126 (1973);
People v. Glover, 49 Ill. 2d 78, 273 N.E.2d 367 (1971); Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 256 N.E.2d
901 (1970); State v. Oswald, 306 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. 1957) (by implication); State v. Maestas, 190
Neb. 312, 207 N.W.2d 699 (1973); State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958); State v.
Clasey, 252 Or. 22, 446 P.2d 116 (1968); State v. Klueber, 81 S.D. 223, 132 N.W.2d 847 (1965);
Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. 1977); State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 151 N.W.2d 157
(1967). For a discussion of the early cases cited above, see Note, CriminalLaw-PsychiatricExamination of Prosecutrixin Rape Case, 45 N.C.L. REv. 234 (1966).
A mandatory exam rule in sex-offense cases prevailed briefly in Indiana. Burton v. State, 232
Ind. 246, 111 N.E.2d 892 (1953). The mandatory aspect of that decision was soon overruled.
Wedmore v. State, 237 Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 (1957). Massachusetts has a statute granting the
trial judge discretion to order a psychiatric examination of a witness, which provides: "In order to
determine the mental condition of any party or witness before any court of the commonwealth,
the presiding judge may, in his discretion, request the department to assign a qualified physician,
who, if assigned shall make such examinations as the judge may deem necessary." MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 123, § 19 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1972).
38. See e.g., Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 172, 410 P.2d 838, 846, 49 Cal. Rptr.
302, 310-11 (1966). The Looney court found no significant distinction between sex-offense cases
and non-sex-offense cases. 294 N.C. at 26, 240 S.E.2d at 626. This conclusion allowed the court to
point to the states that restricted the rule to sex-offense cases and conclude that they had made an
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examinations in any criminal case.39 Second, the various courts disagree, at least semantically, on the standard to be applied by the trial
court when deciding whether the evidence set forth by the defendant
justifies an examination. "Compelling reason" is a popular guide, 40 but
'4 1
other opinions use "substantial showing of need and justification,"
"most compelling of circumstances where it is necessary to insure a just
and orderly disposition of the cause,"'4 2 or "strong showing. ' 43 Third,

courts would react differently to the possibility of a witness refusing to
submit to the exam. There is general agreement that an uncooperative
patient cannot be satisfactorily examined by a psychiatrist,' and,
therefore, a contempt citation is not considered to be a viable enforcement mechanism. 45 Some courts propose that the witness' submission
to the exam be made a precondition to accepting the witness' testi-

mony.46 Others suggest allowing the defense to comment on the witness' refusal, 47 and one commentator advocates a stay or dismissal of
the proceedings in the event a witness refuses to submit to the court-

ordered psychiatric examination.48
The Looney court's apparent conclusion that a motion for a courtordered exam should never be granted was grounded, in part, on the
argument that "[i]t is for the jury to determine in the particular case
whether the particular witness is or is not telling the truth."4 9 But

court-ordered psychiatric exams of witnesses should not be rejected on
arbitrary exception to the general rule against court-ordered psychiatric exams. Id. at 18, 26, 240
S.E.2d at 622, 626.
39. See, e.g., State v. Wahrlich, 105 Ariz. 102, 106, 459 P.2d 727, 731 (1969) (kidnapping);
State v. Butler, 27 NJ. 560, 605, 143 A.2d 530, 556 (1958) (homicide).
40. See, e.g., McDonald v. State, 307 A.2d 796, 798 (Del. 1973); State v. Clasey, 252 Or. 22,
24, 446 P.2d 116, 117 (1968). But see People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 198, 443 P.2d 794, 802, 70
Cal. Rptr. 210, 218 (1975) (court suggested that trial court should rule liberally in favor of defendant and reversed as abuse of discretion trial court's denial of defendant's motion for court-ordered
exam).
41. See, e.g., State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 605, 143 A.2d 530, 556 (1958).
42. See, e.g., Dinkins v. State, 244 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971); Forbes v. State, 559
S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. 1977).
43. 294 N.C. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628 (Exum, J., concurring). The Looney majority used the
phrase "compelling necessity" in ruling that the court below had not abused its discretion in denying Looney's motion. Id.
44. See M. GUTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 286-87 (1952).
45. See, e.g., Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 177, 410 P.2d 838, 849, 49 Cal. Rptr.
302, 313 (1966).
46. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 471-72, 151 N.W.2d 157, 165 (1967).
47. See, e.g., Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 177, 410 P.2d 838, 849, 49 Cal. Rptr.
302, 313 (1966).
48. See Comment, PsychiatricEvaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J.

1324, 1340-41 (1950).
49. 294 N.C. at 27, 240 S.E.2d at 627.
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the ground that because credibility is ultimately a matter for the jury,
allowing expert testimony about the witness' mental condition as it
bears on credibility would invade the province of the jury.50 By anal-

ogy to the issue of a defendant's sanity, also a jury question, courts
have recognized that psychiatrists may lend their special expertise to
aid the jury in assessing a person's mental condition.5 1 States that sanction court-ordered examinations of witnesses to aid in evaluating credibility are concerned that witnesses with certain mental abnormalities
may fabricate or fantasize so convincingly, and with such internal con-

sistency, that without expert psychiatric testimony the jury may be unable to properly assess such a witness' credibility.

2

Assuming

arguendo that such convincing perjurers exist and that psychiatric examination can lead to detection of mental conditions that result in unusually credible perjury, fairness to the accused would seem to require

permitting a court-ordered examination of the witness in cases in which
the witness' testimony is uncorroborated and in which some evidence is

produced tending to show that the witness is mentally abnormal. The
Looney court, however, revealed more confidence in the jury's credibil-

ity-assessing acuity than have advocates of court-ordered exams.53

50. The North Carolina Supreme Court recently stated:
We conclude, therefore, that in determining whether expert medical opinion is to be
admitted into evidence the inquiry should be not whether it invades the province of the
jury, but whether the opinion expressed is really one based on the special expertise of the
expert, that is, whether the witness because of his expertise is in a better position to have
an opinion on the subject than is the trier of fact.
State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 568-69, 247 S.E.2d 905, 911 (1978). See generally MCCORMICK,
supra note 29, § 13.
51. See, e.g., State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238, 204 S.E.2d 649 (1974); State v. DeGregory, 285
N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794 (1974).
52. According to one commentator.
"The witness who is an unknown paranoid schizophrenic often sounds very convincing. Judges and jurors are likely to accept this testimony without the slightest question. A person suffering from such a mental state may have an obvious psychotic
paranoid delusion about one area of his thinking and not about another unrelated area;
therefore, if the testimony does not impinge on the area of this particular paranoid delusion, this witness' testimony would make good sense and would not be obvious to the
casual observer. For example, if a witness has a paranoid delusion toward men, she may
give convincing testimony about a defective stairwell which causes injury to a child. The
psychiatrist, however, is aware that the delusional system in a paranoid schizophrenic is
not specifically limited to certain very narrow confines; rather, it may reflect serious disturbed thinking and spurious reasoning in all areas of the patient's thinking. The qualified psychiatrist would be familiar with the dynamics of such a mental state."
Mack, ForensicPsychiatryandthe Witness:A Survey, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 302, 306 (1958) (quoting Dr. Carolyn H. Montier of the Cleveland Psychiatric Institute). See also M. GUTTMACHER &
H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 44; Davidson, Testimonial Capacity, 39 B.U.L. REv. 172, 179 (1959);
Karpman, Lying, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135 (1949).
53. 294 N.C. at 18, 28, 240 S.E.2d at 622, 627.

456
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In further support of its conclusion concerning the inappropriateness of court-ordered exams, the Looney court also stressed that North
Carolina allows an unrestricted attack on witness credibility during
cross-examination and collaterally. 54 In some states creation of a rule
allowing expert testimony based on a court-ordered psychiatric examination would be an exception to a general rule against collateral attacks
on a witness' mental condition.55 In North Carolina properly obtained
56
evidence of a witness' psychiatric abnormalities is always admissible.
Thus, in weighing the need for a court to order a witness to submit to a
psychiatric credibility exam, because of its estimate of the jury's capabilities and the broad availability of impeachment tools, the North Carolina court found less reason for a court-ordered exam than have many
states.
The Looney court also concluded there had been insufficient concern in other jurisdictions over the burden a court-ordered exam would
place on the witness and on the prosecutorial function. 57 The court's
belief that a witness ordered to submit to psychiatric evaluation would
probably suffer humiliation, damage to his or her career, and a major
invasion of the right to privacy, and that this would have a chilling
effect on prospective witnesses' willingness to testify, was the basis of its
conclusion that this burden outweighed the need for such a court-ordered exam. 58 The court did not compare this burden with other burdensome procedures that state law already imposes on prospective
witnesses: subpoenas, sequestration, competency hearings, and crossexamination. 59 Moreover, the court's concern for possible humiliation
of the witness appears inconsistent with North Carolina cases refusing
54. Id. at 19, 27, 240 S.E.2d at 623, 626. The court's opinion would seem to leave open the
possibility that, in the event the defendant could arrange for the witness to be examined without
obtaining a court order, a psychiatrist could testify to the results. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 232
N.C. 727, 62 S.E.2d 50 (1950); Moyle v. Hopkins, 222 N.C. 33, 21 S.E.2d 826 (1942); State v.
Wright, 29 N.C. App. 752, 225 S.E.2d 645 (1976). This, in effect, happened in Looney, since
defendant used the testimony of the psychiatrist who conducted the examination of Matthews at
Matthews' request in connection with his own trial. 294 N.C. at 4, 240 S.E.2d at 614.
55. See MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 45, at 94 n.19; Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d
159, 173, 410 P.2d 838, 847, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 311 (1966).
56. 294 N.C. at 19, 240 S.E.2d at 623. See also id. at 6, 240 S.E.2d at 620 (citing 2 STANSBURY'S NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§ 38, 42, 44 (H. Brandis rev. 1973)).
57. Id. at 26-27, 240 S.E.2d at 626. The court stated that requiring a witness to submit to a
psychiatric examination "is a drastic invasion of the witness's own right to privacy. To be ordered
by a court to submit to such an examination is, in itself humiliating and potentially damaging to
the reputation and career of the witness." Id. at 27, 240 S.E.2d at 626.
58. Id. at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 627.
59. E.g., State v. Woods, 293 N.C. 58, 235 S.E.2d 47 (1977) (competency); State v. Taylor,
280 N.C. 273, 185 S.E.2d 677 (1972) (sequestration); In re Pierce, 163 N.C. 247, 79 S.E. 507 (1913)
(subpoena). In civil actions N.C.R. Civ. P. 35 empowers the trial judge to order a party to submit
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to limit the scope of character impeachment.6" Nor is the court's concern for the witness' privacy and career consistent with a case such as

Looney in which the witness is an admitted coparticipant serving a life
prison sentence at the time request for an examination is made. 61 The
court's description of the burden placed on the witness seems rather to

assume that the witness is always an innocent bystander or victim. In
the plea-bargaining context, however, the witness often agrees, as in
Looney, to subject his credibility to the jury's scrutiny under cross-examination in exchange for a reduction in the charge against him.

burden of a witness
When there is a quidpro quo of this nature, the
6
credibility exam is clearly more fairly imposed.

1

Because it stopped short of laying down an absolute rule against
court-ordered psychological exams, the Looney opinion proceeded to
analyze whether the denial of defendant's motion constituted an abuse

of discretion. The court noted that Matthews had previously been examined in connection with his own trial by a psychiatrist who con-

cluded that he was competent to stand trial and not insane at the time
he allegedly murdered Looney's wife.63 The trial judge who denied

Looney's second motion that Matthews be examined again for the purpose of assessing his mental condition as it might bear on credibility,
and the supreme court in reviewing that denial, seemed to take the po-

sition that "one exam is enough."'

Logically, there are serious

to a psychiatric exam if good cause for the exam is shown. Cf.Williams v. Williams, 29 N.C. App.
509, 224 S.E.2d 656, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 667, 228 S.E.2d 458 (1976) (child custody proceeding;
husband, wife, and child ordered to submit to psychiatric exam).
60. For example, North Carolina allows an unrestricted attack using the witness' prior convictions. Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967) (traffic violation). Other states have concluded that the value of such an unrestricted attack on the witness'
credibility is outweighed by the burden placed on the witness. See MCCORMICK, supra note 29,

§ 43.

61. Matthews was serving a life sentence at Central Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina, at the
time of the Looney trial. Brief for Appellee at 14.
62. The court apparently believed the only function of allowing the judge to consider a motion for a court-ordered exam to be a means to compel the witness to submit to an exam against
his will. The court framed the issue presented by defendant's appeal as whether the court should
"hold that a trial court in this state may require a witness, against his will, to subject himself to a
psychiatric examination." 294 N.C. at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 627. The facts in Looney, however, suggest another function may be played by the court order. In a situation in which an alleged coparticipant is testifying against his alleged partner in exchange for a reduction in charges, the witness
may actually be indifferent to undergoing psychiatric evaluation. In this context, the role of the
court order may be to overcome the State's opposition to the examination of a willing witness. In
other contexts, a witness may sensibly reject a direct request by the defense that he undergo psychiatric examination, but the same witness may respect an impartial determination by the trial
judge that an exam is needed in the interests of justice.
63. See note 7 supra.
64. See 294 N.C. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628; Record at 18-19; note 12 supra.
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problems with this conclusion. The four occasions for the use of psy-

chiatric evaluation65 are governed by different legal standards. Thus, a
finding that a prospective witness was previously competent to stand
trial is not conclusive on the question whether he has a mental abnormality bearing on credibility.6 6 The examining psychiatrist in the com-

petency to stand trial situation may conduct a more limited exploration
of a person's mental condition and may measure his observation of the
patient by different guidelines than if he were asked to evaluate how a
person's mental condition bears on credibility.67

Most states have found that corroborative evidence supporting the
testimony of the witness whose credibility is challenged militates
against finding there is sufficient reason for ordering a psychiatric evaluation of the witness' credibility.6 The quantity of corroborative evidence in Looney may have justified the North Carolina Supreme
Court's finding that there had been no abuse of discretion in the denial
of defendant's motion.69 But in suggesting that court-ordered exams
65. See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
66. Presumably, there are certain mental incompetents who are so incapacitated that they
would be found insane, incompetent to stand trial, and not credible as a witness. But for most
levels of mental defect a separate inquiry should be made, keeping in mind the legal standard to
be applied. See 2 STANSBURY's NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§ 38,42,44 (H. Brandis rev. 1973);
Comment, Pre-TrialPsychiatric Examination as ProposedMeansfor Testing the Complainants
Competency to Allege a Sex Offense, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 651.
67. For example, a psychiatrist examining a person who has asserted an insanity defense
must focus on the person's sanity at some point in the past and will not be considering how the
person's present mental condition might bear on credibility. Psychiatrists tend to analyze a patient's mental problems in terms of thresholds in determining whether and what type of treatment
is called for, and may resort to a similar threshold analysis when asked to apply the different legal
standards for insanity, competency, and credibility. See Pollack, The Role ofPsychiatryin the Rule
of Law, in PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: DIAGNOSIS & DEBATE 11, 18-19 (R. Bonnie
ed. 1977); Pollack, PrinciplesofForensic Psychiatryfor Psychiatric-LegalOpinion Making, 1971
LEGAL MED. ANN. 261. Both defendant and the State recognized in their briefs the important
difference in the goals and definitions of an exam to test criminal insanity and competency to
stand trial, and an exam to investigate the person's mental condition as it bears on credibility.
Brief for Appellant at 5; Brief for Appellee at 12. See also MCCORMICK, supra note 29, §§ 33, 6 1.
68. See, e.g., State v. Clasey, 252 Or. 22, 24, 446 P.2d 116, 117 (1968); Brief for Appellant at
8.
69. See note 17 supra. In applying the "compelling necessity" standard the Looney court's
finding of no abuse of discretion appears inconsistent with other courts' application of analogous
standards. The court noted that defendant was able to adduce some strong evidence raising
doubts about Matthews' credibility because of his mental condition, and therefore concluded that
he failed to show a compelling necessity for the exam. 294 N.C. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628. Other
courts, in contrast, might have required defendant's initial showing of mental abnormality as necessary to pass a threshold evidentiary test used to screen out frivolous requests. See, e.g., State v.
Kahinu, 53 Haw. 536, 546, 498 P.2d 635, 642 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973). The
Looney opinion therefore may require defendants to walk a tightrope of producing sufficient evidence that the witness has a mental condition bearing on credibility to justify an exam, but not so
much evidence that the exam will be considered unnecessary.

1979]

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

459

can never be justified,70 the supreme court may have undervalued the
need for a psychiatric examination that can arise in special circumstances, overreacted to the burden such an exam imposes on certain
witnesses, and denied North Carolina trial courts 1a potentially effective
7
evidentiary tool for assessing witness credibility.
KURT

D.

WINTERKORN

Federal Jurisdiction-Civil Rights-Monell v. Department of
SocialServices: The Court Compromises on Municipal
Liability Under Section 1983
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act' provides a federal2 cause of

action for any person whose constitutional rights have been violated

"under color of state law." Since the Supreme Court's expansive defi-

nition of "under color of state law" in Monroe v. Pape3 in 1961, the
70. For a discussion of the role of the expert psychiatric witness in the interaction of law and
modem science and an earlier reluctance of the North Carolina courts to increase reliance on
psychiatric opinion, see A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolinain 1943, 21 N.C.L. REV.
323, 348 (1943).
71. Justice Exum, in his concurring opinion, concluded, "Situations calling for the entry of
such an order would, it seems, be rare indeed. But if called for, our judges should have the power
to enter the order." 294 N.C. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628 (concurring opinion).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. Jurisdiction to hear § 1983 claims is conferred upon the federal courts by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) (1970), which provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to
be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of
the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
3. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

